2003年度秋季研究会報告要旨


TVE Growth and Interregional Imbalances in Jiangsu, China

Junichi Ito (Policy Research Institute, MAFF)

Abstract

    The major objective of this paper is to shed some light on the mechanism that generates interregional imbalances among communities in rural China. Central to this issue is the development of township and village enterprises (TVEs) because their presence is closely associated with the economic welfare of the people residing in rural communities. The spatial disparities are attributed to a variety of factors, including the less efficient use of TVE resources in poor areas, the decentralized fiscal system, and agglomeration economies. In short, the socialist regime of self-reliance that still lingers in China's rural society traps less advanced areas in poverty.


中国およびモンゴル国の市場経済化と牧畜経済の変容

鬼木俊次 (農林水産政策研究所)
双喜 (農林水産政策研究所)

要 旨

 中国内モンゴル自治区およびモンゴル国では近年,市場経済化が進展してきたが,それに伴い,草原地域では家畜頭数が増加し,地域的な過放牧問題が顕在化するようになった.内モンゴルでは草地は個別的に分け与えられ,牧民は定住化するようになったが,モンゴル国では民主化後も草地の占有は認められていない.本報告は,両地域の牧畜経済を比較することによって,市場経済下の牧畜経済における土地利用制度の役割を浮き彫りにする.牧畜経営データに基づく分析から,モンゴル国では都市に近い地域で所得が低く,生産の効率性が低いことが分かる.これは都市周辺で過放牧が起こっているためである.内モンゴルでは全体的な過放牧の問題はあるが,都市周辺で特に所得が低くなる傾向はない.全体的な牧畜生産の非効率性はモンゴル国で顕著である.草地の個別化は地域的な生産の集中を緩和し,効率的な生産と草地利用を促す一定の効果がある.しかしそれだけでは十分ではなく,地域的なアンバランスを是正する政策介入が求められる.


マグロの供給モデルの試作―世界需給モデル構築に向けて―

多田稔 (国際農林水産業研究センター)

要 旨

 水産物の生産関数は理論的には漁獲量=f(漁獲努力量,資源量)と定式化できるが,漁獲努力量や資源量の時系列データの入手が困難でありモデル化が遅れている.このため,オープンアクセス(自由漁業)の下で資源が減少する場合,価格の上昇によってますます漁獲圧が上昇し資源枯渇に向かうのか,それともコスト上昇が価格上昇を上回るために均衡が回復するのか不明であった.

 そこで水産物供給のモデル化に着手した.マグロ類の資源動向は,イワシ等の小型浮魚類にみられるほど極端な自然要因の影響を受けにくいため,水産物全般の供給動向のモデル化を考える第一歩として適当な対象であると考えられる.資源量等の情報の有無に応じて4種類の供給関数を計測した結果,概ね良好な結果を得たが,小型のビンナガマグロについては決定係数が低いものとなった.小型魚の供給関数に関しては今後の課題である.


西アフリカにおける低湿地の土地所有制度と稲作技術の普及

桜井武司 (国際農林水産業研究センター)

要 旨 

    Demand for rice has been increasing due to population growth as well as urbanization in West Africa. Rainfed lowland is expected to meet the growing demand for rice because it has great potential for rice production development not only for area expansion but also for improving yield through intensification. Thus the objective of this paper is to explore factors influencing the intensification of rice production in rainfed lowland ecology. Particularly, this paper focuses on water control technologies in lowlands, i.e. bunds and canals, and analyzes the effects of land tenure security on investment in the technologies using data collected in the area around Bouake, the second largest city in central Cote d'Ivoire.

    Two types of data are used for the analyses. One is village/lowland level data collected from 179 randomly selected villages around the city of Bouake. The other is cultivator level data collected from 64 randomly selected rice cultivators within the city of Bouake.

    Based on the village/lowland level data, two types of land ownership of lowland are identified: village ownership and family ownership. Then, a Probit regression analysis explains the factors affecting the choice of lowland ownership. The main findings are that village ownership exists in lowlands easily monitored and that ethnically homogenous villages are more likely to have village-owned lowlands particularly if they have ethnic culture of community solidarity. On the other hand, population pressure and market access, which are suggested to be relevant by the induced institutional innovation theory, have no significant effect on the land ownership. Then, a subsequent regression analysis shows that village ownership itself has no significant effect on cultivators' adoption of water control technologies. Rather it is significantly influenced by population pressure from immigrants as well as market accessibility, as predicted by the induced technological innovation.

    Then, rice cultivator data collected in the city of Bouake is analyzed. Unlike the case of villages, there is no village ownership of lowland in the city, and land tenure security is proxied individually by the status of tenants and land owners. The analyses reveal that investment in bunds and canals is influenced by the land tenure security. The results also suggest that land rights are endogenous and can be enhanced by investment. This point was formally tested and partially confirmed. That is, tenant cultivators can enhance land use rights by investing in irrigation canals, but cannot enhance transfer rights. Finally, estimation of a profit function shows that the investment in irrigation canals is not merely for enhancing land tenure security but also for improving rice production.

    The two-level analyses conclude that although customary land tenure system in rural villages does not hinder investment in land, it may become a problem in urban area where lowland rice production is likely to be carried out by immigrants and to be more intensified. The finding gives one concern that if land ownership is strengthened by formal titling system or informal individualization, tenant cultivators in rainfed lowland may be discouraged to invest in water control technologies.


Spatial Water Management under Alternative Institutional Arrangements

U. Chakravorty (総合地球環境学研究所)
C. Umetsu (総合地球環境学研究所)
D. Zilberman (総合地球環境学研究所)

Abstract

    This paper examines the impact of alternative institutional arrangements in the generation, distribution and allocation of water. More specifically, it develops a spatial framework to address what happens to aggregate water use, output and prices as well as to the pattern of water allocation, technology investments and quasi-rents over space under alternative market structures such as an output monopoly, a water-users' association, a public utility and a project without government intervention. The analytical results are illustrated with data from California agriculture and suggest that if government intervention is costly, an output or input monopoly may be a preferred second-best alternative to a decentralized project under high output elasticities.


A Revolution of Microeconomics with Special Reference to Agriculture

Yoshihiro Maruyama (Tsukuba Women's University)

Abstract

    In the perfectly competitive markets microeconomics is so organized as to help individual units determine their quantities demanded or supplied at the given market prices. But in agriculture, especially, in its less developed stages many resources lack competitive markets for them, or the markets for them are constrained in the sense that the quantities demanded or supplied of individual units are limited at the going prices. Then microeconomics should undergo a revolution. It is requested to help individual units not only determine their quantities demanded or supplied at the market prices but also determine their "internal prices" (Sonoda and Maruyama, 1999) of the resources for which the formal or external markets are missing or constrained. These internal prices, in turn, cooperate with market prices to allocate these resources among alternative uses, e.g., crops and animals. Thus, the internal prices should offer crucial information to any development programs in agriculture.

Sonoda, T., and Y. Maruyama. "Effects of the Internal Wage on Output Supply: A Structural Estimation for Japanese Rice Farmers." American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 81 (February 1999): 131-143.


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